In the wake of the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate (FFR) target essentially to zero and resorted to unconventional monetary policy. With the nominal FFR constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), empirical monetary models cannot be estimated as usual. We investigate whether alternative policy instruments (e.g., long-term rates or the shadow rates proposed by Krippner [2015a] and Wu and Xia [2016]) can be considered substitutes for the FFR over the ZLB period in a standard monetary VAR or whether we must impose breaks. We …nd that, when using a dataset that spans both the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods, shadow rates act as a fairly good proxy for monetary policy by producing impulse responses of macro indicators similar to what we would expect based on the post-WWII, non-ZLB benchmark and by displaying stable parameter estimates when compared to this benchmark. [JEL codes: E43, E44, E52] 
Introduction
Since the onset of the Financial Crisis, monetary policy in the U.S. has taken unprecedented measures in an e¤ort to stimulate the economy. The Federal Reserve lowered its primary policy instrument-the target for the federal funds rate-essentially to zero. 1 At that point, this instrument became ine¤ective due to the nominal bound at zero and the Fed was forced to resort to unconventional monetary policy. 2 From the standpoint of academics, this period presents an important problem for assessing the e¤ects of monetary policy. Many monetary models use the e¤ective nominal federal funds rate (FFR) to represent the stance of policy. Nominal interest rates, however, cannot take on negative values in a world in which cash is a viable alternative to standard short-term assets. Because the nominal FFR has been constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) for an extended period, empirical monetary models cannot be estimated as usual. Even in models for which determining the e¤ects of monetary policy is not the primary objective (e.g., measuring the e¤ects of …scal policy), a proper measure of the stance of monetary policy is often necessary.
The empirical literature o¤ers a number of potential remedies. First, we could treat the ZLB period as special, using either breaks or dummies to represent changes in economic relationships. 3 Second, we could include alternative policy instruments, such as the size of the balance sheet or dummies representing the implementation of unconventional policies. These two alternatives have the disadvantage of increasing the number of estimated parameters for a period that, presumably, represents a short sample. Third, we could replace the FFR as the conventional stance of monetary policy with a proxy that is allowed to violate the ZLB and that captures the e¤ects of both conventional and unconventional policy.
Since the …nancial crisis, academics have proposed such proxies of the accommodative stance of monetary policy when the short rate is at the ZLB. Recently, Krippner [2015a] and Wu and Xia [2016] have used the shadow rate methodology to construct alternative measures of the stance of policy. Krippner [2015a] builds on Black [1995] and Gorovoi and Linetsky [2004] , modeling interest rates as options by calculating the value of a call option to hold cash. 4 Krippner [2015a] derives a continuous-time version of the option-pricing framework and integrates the implied expression for the forward rate to apply the model directly to observed data on interest rates. Alternatively, Wu and Xia [2016] utilizes the discrete-time version of this model to construct an analytical approximation of forward rates, thus producing closed-form expressions used to approximate the shadow forward rates. Both models calculate a shadow short-term interest rate which would be seen in …nancial markets if the cash option did not exist. In principle, the Fed may have dropped the FFR further if not for the nominal bound at zero. The shadow rate has been considered a proxy for the stance of monetary policy in an environment in which the zero lower bound is binding. 5 From this foundation one can develop a full model of the shadow term structure based upon the shadow short rate depicting the fundamental policy objectives.
In this paper, we compare these approaches to modeling monetary policy at the ZLB in commonly-used, benchmark linear or piecewise-linear models. Many of the papers analyzing monetary policy after the Great Recession either (1) …x the dataset and innovate along the model dimension; 6 (2) …x the model dimension and propose a new measure for the stance of monetary policy; 7 or (3) vary both the policy instrument and the model. 8 We …x the model to be the linear VAR (consistent with the pre-ZLB literature) and consider the use of a variety of di¤erent policy instruments. 9 Our results show that, using the various monetary policy measures, our VARs fail to …nd any discernible di¤erences in the macroeconomic e¤ects of monetary policy. That is, the impulse 4 Black [1995] modi…ed the Gaussian a¢ ne term structure model (GATSM) to relax the nominal ZLB by introducing a hypothetical instantaneous shadow (zero maturity) interest rate that can take on negative values. When the nominal rate is above the ZLB, the shadow rate takes on the nominal value.
5 Damjanović and Masten [2016] used shadow short rates in the Euro area and found the results to be senstive to the probability of sovereign default. Because our focus is on the U.S., we do not face that issue here. 6 For example, Aastveit et al (2016) ; Baumeister and Benati (2013); and Feldkircher and Huber (2016) advocate the use of time-varying parameter VARs.
7 Krippner [2015a] and Wu and Xia [2016] utilize models of the term structure to compute hypothetical shadow short rates meant to replace the funds rate in a zero-lower-bound environment. 8 For example, Gambacorta, Ho¤man and Peersman (2014) consider a model of only the ZLB period-essentially a model with breaks-using the size of the Fed's balance sheet as a policy instrument. 9 The main di¤erence between our approach and (1) and (3) is that we ask "can we retain the linear VAR?"rather than "how much does the VAR need to change?" This implicitly assumes the VAR as the reference model and is similar to thinking about switching the null and alternative hypotheses. Unlike the approach of (2), we test multiple alternative policy instruments, including multiple SSRs, long rates, and the balance sheet. responses using the shadow rate measures (that accounts for the ZLB period) are all contained within the con…dence bands of similar impulse responses when we naïvely apply the FFR as policy instrument without accounting for the ZLB period. We also …nd that the method proposed by Krippner [2015a] delivers stable parameter estimates when the ZLB period is included in the sample.
Under the assumption of no structural shift in the conduct of monetary policy, we view the stability of the parameters in favor of using the Krippner shadow rate to represent policy during the unique environment at the ZLB. 10 However, using either shadow rate is preferable to using the bounded FFR.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the benchmark VAR that describes monetary policy in the pre-ZLB environment and for the full sample through the end of 2015. In this section, we also test for parameter stability just prior to the onset of the ZLB period.
Section 3 examines how we can model some of the actions taken by the Fed at the zero lower bound in these standard models. Section 4 presents some robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Establishing a Benchmark
The short rate-often, an overnight rate-is one of the primary instruments for conducting monetary policy. When adverse shocks are large, monetary accommodation can drive the short rate close to zero. In practice, no-arbitrage conditions prevent nominal rates from falling below zero since agents can substitute out of bonds into cash. This feature of nominal interest rates can prevent a proper evaluation of the stance of monetary policy when the short rate is at or near zero and other instruments must be relied upon to conduct policy. In this section, we estimate a standard monetary VAR for the pre-crisis period (1960 ( :I-2007 and then naïvely extend the analysis with data for the …nancial crisis period.
The Pre-ZLB VAR
Before we can determine whether empirical models of monetary policy have changed, we must …rst establish a pre-ZLB benchmark, covering the period from 1960:I to 2007:IV, which starts after the Korean War price control period and ends prior to the …nancial crisis and generally resembles the standard VAR used for monetary analysis prior to the FFR hitting the ZLB. We estimate a quarterly four-variable VAR(4) in output, in ‡ation, commodity prices, and a policy instrument.
Our measure of output is the annualized quarterly di¤erence in the log of GDP taken from the BEA. In ‡ation is measured as the di¤erence in the log of the GDP de ‡ator, obtained from the FRED database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Commodity prices are the log di¤erences in the Producer Price Index: All Commodities. For the benchmark model, we include the e¤ective FFR as the policy instrument. 11 All data are seasonally adjusted.
To …x notation, we write the structural VAR as
where B 1 (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, u t are the iid standard normal and uncorrelated structural shocks. We suppress the constant and any trends for notational simplicity. The corresponding reduced-form VAR is
where A (L) = B . We estimate the VAR in the reduced form and recover the structural form by imposing restrictions on the contemporaneous e¤ects. In particular, the monetary shock is identi…ed by assuming that FFR can react to macro variables but the macro variables cannot contemporaneously react to shocks to the FFR. Our identi…cation, then, amounts to a recursive ordering; we explore alternative identi…cations in a later section.
Partitioning A (L) into blocks will facilitate exposition in future sections: Let X t represent the macro variables of interest and R t represent the FFR. Then, we can rewrite the VAR as:
where A X (L) represents the e¤ects of the lagged macro variables on each other, A RX (L) represents the e¤ects of policy on the macro variables, A XR (L) represents the feedback from macro variables 1 1 We also estimated the VAR in log levels of the macro variables and …nd no signi…cant changes in the results. 
Testing for Parameter Instability
If one believed that the policy environment changed dramatically at the ZLB, a …rst reaction might be to impose a break at, say, 2007:IV, just before the nominal funds rate hit the bound. Let M 0 and M 1 represent the no-break and break models, respectively. To determine whether the data prefer the break model to the no-break model, we compute twice the log of the Bayes Factor to obtain a statistic B that has scale comparable to that of the likelihood ratio test statistic:
where (Y jM i ) is the marginal likelihood of the data, given model M i . 13 We construct a dummy variable to indicate data from the ZLB period during the crisis and post-crisis recovery, taking on a value of 0 for dates prior to and including 2007:IV and a value of 1 after 2007:IV. We test for parameter instability in …ve subsets of the model parameters: (1) a break in the variance/covariance matrix ( ) only; (2) a break in the response of macro variables to the policy instrument, A RX (L); (3) a combination of (1) and (2) -breaks in and A RX (L); (4) a break the full set of VAR coe¢ cients, A (L) ; and (5) a combination of (1) and (4) -breaks in and A (L). To impose the breaks in (2) and (3), we include an interaction between the ZLB dummy parameters and those estimated with the ZLB data included. 1 3 We compute the marginal likelihood using the output of the Gibbs sampler with the method described in Chib [1995] . We use the scale suggested in Je¤reys [1961] variable and all lags of the policy rate in each of the …rst three VAR equations. Therefore, the break model allows for a change in the VAR coe¢ cients on the policy rate in each of the equations describing the behavior of the fundamental macroeconomic variables. To impose the breaks in (4) and (5), we include an interaction between the ZLB dummy variable and all lags of the Y t vector in all four equations of the VAR. 14 The …rst line of Table 1 show the values of B comparing models for a VAR(4) using the e¤ective FFR as the monetary instrument for the entire post-war sample (1960 ( :I-2015 . 15 We …nd strong evidence in favor of breaks in the parameters relating macro variables to monetary policy. 16 The model with parameter instability is favored over the baseline model when allowing for variation in the response of macro variables to the FFR, A RX (L), and variation in . The break in A RX (L) results from the fact that the fed funds rate exhibits no variation in the post break period, perhaps biasing the coe¢ cients in the no break model. Likewise, the variance of the FFR innovation (and the associated covariances) change in the ZLB period. However, a (simultaneous) break in the full set of model parameters (cases (4) and (5) described above) is not favored. These cases introduce instability in the parameters describing the dynamics among the macro variables or shocks to these variables. It is not clear that these relationships should di¤er once the economy reaches the ZLB. Furthermore, allowing for parameter instability in the VAR(4) models introduces an excessive number of new parameters to estimate with limited data over the ZLB period; thus, we do not …nd de…nitive evidence supporting the models with breaks. 17 3 Monetary Policy at the ZLB We want to be able to account for the e¤ects of the Fed's unconventional monetary policy during the times in which the FFR is at the ZLB. Using the FFR alone to represent policy would erroneously suggest that the Fed was inactive during the depths of the …nancial crisis and did little to stimulate the recovery. We need to incorporate the policy accommodation associated with the balance sheet and liquidity programs and the use of forward guidance that were employed by the Fed during the crisis. However, we want to do this in the simplest and most straightforward way possible. In particular, we pose the following question: Is there a policy instrument that summarizes the stance of monetary policy during the ZLB period that retains the linearity of the VAR?
Ideally, the new instrument would map back into some observable indicators, allowing one to address policy questions that can be answered in the same linear framework without requiring breaks. Other authors have proposed various alternative policy instruments-e.g., long rates or balance sheet. 18 We …rst augment the VAR with a long-term interest rate to incorporate how the Fed's unconventional policies e¤ectively ‡attened the yield curve by in ‡uencing rates at the longer horizon and compare the responses to those of the benchmark VAR model. Finally, we will use the two shadow rate measures that explicitly account for the ZLB period (one adopted from Krippner [2015a] and the other from Wu and Xia [2016] ) as proxies for the policy instrument and again compare the impulse responses associated with these measures to the benchmark responses.
Adding Alternative Monetary Instruments
As we mentioned above, during the ZLB period, the Fed began to utilize alternative policy measures intended to provide temporary injections of liquidity and often targeted yields for longer maturity assets. These policies also represented a substantial increase in the Fed's balance sheet. We consider whether adding a long-term interest rate or the size of the Fed's balance sheet to the VAR is su¢ cient to capture the e¤ect of large scale asset purchase programs. In each case, we add the new policy instrument, ordered last, to the baseline VAR and identify shocks to the alternative policy instrument via the Cholesky decomposition.
During the ZLB period, the responses of the macro variables to a shock to the long-term interest rate or to the size of the balance sheet, accounting for the fact that the FFR is already at zero and does not ‡uctuate after these shocks, are computed using generalized impulse responses (GIRFs), …rst proposed by Koop et al. [1996] . 19 We construct GIRFs for all variables in the VAR, restricting the FFR to remain at its initial value at the time of the shock. In this way, we capture aggregate ‡uctuations as measures of unconventional policy-such as changes in long-term interest rates or the balance sheet-vary, while imposing that the short-term policy instrument is constrained. Figure 2 compares (1) the GIRF to a 25-basis-point increase in the 10-year Treasury Bond rate in the ZLB with a traditional 25-basis-point increase in the FFR in normal times, and (2) the GIRF of the 10-year T-Bond shock in the ZLB period with a similar T-Bond shock in normal times, allowing the FFR to respond without restriction. The response of GDP growth to the 10-year T-Bond shock in the ZLB resembles the response to the benchmark FFR shock. This suggests that the channel through which policy a¤ects real activity through long rates is similar to the e¤ect via short rates under normal conditions. However, in the ZLB period, the responses of nominal variables, in ‡ation and commodity prices, look more similar to those in response to benchmark long-rate shocks, with no restrictions, rather than conventional FFR shocks. As depicted in Figure   2 , the ZLB responses of the FFR are restricted to be zero at all horizons, compared with the richer dynamics in the benchmark when the policy rate is left unconstrained. Finally, the persistence of a shock to the 10-year T-Bond rate under normal or ZLB conditions is almost identical, thus una¤ected by the constraints imposed on the short end of the term structure.
We also want to determine whether the addition resolves the need to incorporate breaks. The second lines of each panel in Table 1 compare the break statistic for the VARs that includes the 10-year Treasury Bond rate after the FFR. We …nd evidence favoring a break in A RX (L) and for the full-sample model. The explanatory value of long-term interest rates increases during the early stages of the …nancial crisis and during the period in which the FFR is lowered towards the ZLB.
Incorporating these additional dynamics emphasizes the variation underlying the structural form of the model and ampli…es the importance of allowing for parameter instability. This very strong evidence favoring changing coe¢ cients over constant coe¢ cients on lagged values of the policy instrument in the equations for the macro variables suggests that accounting for the unconventional policy via long-term interest rates is not su¢ cient to maintain VAR linearity. 20 1 9 GIRFs use Monte Carlo methods to compute the di¤erence in two indirect forecasts-one conditional on the shock and one conditional on no shock. 2 0 We …nd some evidence supporting a break in the matrix in both the full-sample and post-Great Moderation VAR(1) model. This further supports the need to allow for variation in the volatility of reduced-form shocks at the ZLB.
We also consider adding the size of the Fed's balance sheet to the VAR to more directly capture the e¤ects of unconventional policy. We estimate the VAR(1) from Section 2.1 with data from 2008:I through 2015:II, including the macroeconomic data in log levels and the FFR in levels. 21 We obtain comparable results to those found in Gambacorta et al. [2014] : increasing the size of the Fed's balance sheet has expansionary e¤ects. The naïve approach would then be to simply add the balance sheet to the full-sample VAR. However, shocks to the balance sheet would presumably only represent countercyclical policy action during the ZLB period when the FFR is constrained.
Thus, we construct GIRFs to a one-standard-deviation increase in the balance sheet during the ZLB period, again restricting the FFR to remain at its initial level. Figure 3 depicts the expected expansionary e¤ects of such a policy. We evaluate the need for breaks in the VAR coe¢ cients using the balance sheet and compute B for this speci…cation. However, we …nd no evidence favoring a break under these circumstances. The balance sheet data exhibit considerable volatility during the ZLB period and thus estimates of in the post-break sample are too imprecise to suggest a break provides any improvement in model …t. Therefore, we do not report those results in Table 1 .
Accounting for shocks to the long-term interest rate or the size of the balance sheet produces a su¢ cient representation of policy for the full post-war period, including a majority of non-ZLB data. However, augmenting the model in this way may not diminish the need for parameter breaks to model the ZLB period and also might prove to be an ine¢ cient approach for future empirical work once we return to a normal, non-ZLB environment and these supplementary instruments may no longer be important for measuring conventional policy e¤ects. The Fed has a variety of alternative policy programs in its arsenal but does not need to use them when it can adjust the FFR e¤ectively. Including alternative measures of policy in addition to the FFR introduces more parameters to estimate. Furthermore, adding variables speci…c to the ZLB period is an extreme treatment that mimics a break in the linear VAR. If there do exist breaks in the coe¢ cients during times of crisis, it is very di¢ cult for policymakers to construct meaningful forecasts and obtain a clear guide to the appropriate policy action. In response to this, we pose the question: Can we …nd a proxy measurement of R t that captures the stance of policy across all periods? We attempt to answer this question with the use of shadow interest rates.
Shadow Short Rates
As an alternative to including long rates in the VAR, one could examine the term structure of interest rates to uncover a potential alternative policy instrument. 22 Black [1995] proposed a model with a hypothetical shadow bond with the same maturity as the policy instrument and an unconstrained shadow interest rate. The nominal short rate, R t , can then be expressed as the maximum of the shadow short rate (SSR), r t , and a (potentially non-zero) lower bound for r t , r:
When the nominal rate hits the bound, the SSR is still unconstrained and can fall below r. 23 To compare with the Wu and Xia [2016] 3-factor shadow rate, we use the 2-factor model from Krippner
[2015a] with a …xed r = 0:25, which is consistent across both approaches. Krippner [2015b] argues in favor of 2-factor over 3-factor models. 24 Krippner [2015a] and Wu and Xia [2016] argue that SSRs can be used to measure the stance of monetary policy when nominal rates hit the ZLB. SSRs, however, are purely …nancial constructs that do not explicitly take into account their e¤ect on macro variables. 25 If we are to use SSRs in empirical models of monetary policy, we need to know whether standard VAR models can be extended through the ZLB period by replacing the e¤ective FFR with the exogenously constructed SSR or if the ZLB period, in and of itself, requires a di¤erent model. Reading from left to right, the solid vertical lines indicate the announcements of: QE1, QE2, 2 2 Bauer and Rudebusch [2016] include macroeconomic factors in the shadow rate model but do not propose using the shadow rate itself to describe the stance of monetary policy. They argue that when the markets anticipate a lift-o¤ might re ‡ect the stance of policy. also proposed a number of alternative measures of the stance of policy but suggested that they may not be useful for evaluating the e¤ects of policy in a linear framework.
2 3 Krippner [2015a] , Wu and Xia [2016] , and Christensen and Rudebusch [2015] each estimate di¤erent SSRs and …nd that they can di¤er depending on the number of factors and the choice of r. Krippner [2015a] both experiments with …xed (0 or 25 basis points) or estimated levels of r. Wu and Xia [2016] …xes r at 25 basis points.
2 4 We repeated the exercises of Sections 3.2 and 3.4 for the Krippner [2015a] 2-factor model with r = 0 and the 3-factor model with r = 0 and r = 0:25 and found no qualitative di¤erences. These results are available upon request.
Operation Twist, QE3, and the "Taper Tantrum", the …rst time the Fed mentioned the possibility of tapering the QE programs. The dashed vertical lines indicate the …rst usage of the "extended period" language, date-based forward guidance, and threshold-based forward guidance. Following the announcement of QE1 and the use of "extended period" language, both SSRs fall until the announcement of QE2 in 2010:IV. The Krippner SSR rises slightly but then falls again until the Fed's forward guidance is adjusted to incorporate speci…c thresholds for the unemployment and in ‡ation rates in 2012:IV. Alternatively, the Wu-Xia SSR stays consistently low and stable until the "Taper Tantrum". 26 To assess the viability of SSRs as a policy instrument, we estimate the same VAR(4) as above, replacing the fed funds rate with a SSR. Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of the VAR using the We consider whether replacing the FFR with the SSRs can eliminate the need for including parameter breaks for the ZLB period. Lines 3 and 4 of Table 1 show B comparing models using the Krippner [2015a] and Wu and Xia [2016] SSRs as the policy instrument, respectively. There is very slight evidence suggesting the need for a shift in the macro responses to the Wu and Xia [2016] SSR in the VAR(4) model over the entire post-war sample. 27 Conversely, when using the Krippner
[2015a] SSR, the VAR(4) results always favor the constant-parameter model. This shadow rate takes on greater negative values, suggesting a more accommodative policy stance, which may help recreate the responses to the pre-ZLB FFR shocks. 28 2 6 For a more detailed discussion, see Krippner [2012] and Wu and Xia [2016] . 2 7 Evidence supporting a break in A RX (L) is dimished for the post-Great Moderation subsample. 2 8 Hännikäinen [2016] compares the marginal predictive power of the Krippner [2015a] and Wu and Xia [2016] SSRs for U.S. real activity and in ‡ation using a large dataset including both economic and …nancial market data and …nds that, while both SSRs have out-of-sample predictive power for in ‡ation, the Wu and Xia [2016] shadow rate produces more accurate forecasts. Alternatively, neither SSR has predictive power for real activity.
Policy E¤ects During the ZLB Period
These results suggest that replacing the FFR with a SSR is one method to maintaining a consistent linear VAR when estimating a model with data that includes the ZLB period. But are the e¤ects of a SSR shock di¤erent if we only use data from the ZLB period? The SSR experiences a substantial downward movement in the early stages of the Great Recession and, thereafter, becomes increasingly negative while the FFR remains near zero. Do these downward movements in the SSRs represent signi…cant policy stimulus associated with unconventional policies when the FFR does not deviate from the ZLB? Wu and Xia [2016] treat the recessionary period di¤erently than the subsequent period when the economy is no longer in recession but the FFR is still at the ZLB and unconventional policies are still in use. They argue for using the shadow rate to model policy action only after the recessionary conditions subside. We desire a comprehensive measure of policy even during the recessionary period. The large negative shocks that pushed the economy into recession and drove the FFR towards zero are important for determining the validity of the SSR approach to modeling policy in these abnormal environments.
We re-estimate the VAR and include only the period after the onset of the ZLB to look specifically at economic conditions when the SSR should provide more information than the FFR alone.
Due to the limited amount of data for this period, we shorten the number of lags in the VAR to include only one lag of the vector of dependent variables. 29 Figure 6 shows both the impulse responses of the benchmark VAR(1) and a VAR (1) The impulse responses are estimated with much less precision and the posterior coverage is considerably wider using only ZLB data; however, the median benchmark responses do tend to fall within the considerably wide posterior coverage. For the ZLB period, the Wu-Xia SSR produces a larger decline in output than the Krippner SSR, which still produces a larger decline than the FFR in the pre-ZLB period. 30 Not surprisingly, the median responses of in ‡ation and commodity prices ‡uctuate substantially from the benchmark. During the ZLB period, in ‡ation did not ‡uctuate much, which appears to amplify the price puzzle. Caution must be taken when interpreting these results as the response of in ‡ation implies a price puzzle in the benchmark VAR(1) but neither of the SSRs replicate this type of response during the ZLB period. Contractionary policy shocks are associated with falling in ‡ation and commodity prices using the Krippner SSR but falling in ‡ation and rising commodity prices with the Wu-Xia SSR. As we previously discussed, the SSR may incorporate future expectations as it extracts data from interest rates and investment decisions. 31
Quantifying Distance from the Benchmark Model
Next, we test whether there are appreciable di¤erences in the impulse responses to a shock to the SSR estimated over the full sample versus the responses to a shock to the FFR in our benchmark pre-ZLB sample. To do this, we construct the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) between the posterior distribution of the benchmark VAR parameters and the posterior distribution of the VAR parameters estimated using the alternative policy instruments. 32 We can think of the KLD as a type of loss function that measures deviations between distributions. 33 We take the benchmark, pre-ZLB posterior parameter distributions as the truth and measure the extent to which the posterior distributions di¤er from this when using the shadow rate proxies.
We also computed the percentage of the posterior of impulse responses with the alternative measurements of policy that overlap with the posterior of impulse responses of the benchmark. We implement this by computing the 90-percent coverage interval of each posterior and then computing 3 0 Lombardi and Zhu [2014] construct an alternative version of the shadow rate using a dynamic factor model and treating the federal funds rate as unobserved during the ZLB period. Structural shocks to their shadow funds rate produced by a standard monetary VAR suggest greater stimulus than shocks to the actual federal funds rate.
3 1 For robustness, we repeat these impulse response comparisons after adjusting the benchmark to begin after the end of the Great Moderation (1984 Moderation ( :I-2007 :IV) rather than using the entire post-war sample. We reach the same qualititative conclusions regarding the deviation from the benchmark for full-sample and ZLB sub-sample responses using the FFR and the shadow rates.
3 2 While it would be ideal to consider the di¤erence in the distributions of the impulse responses themselves, there is a one-to-one mapping between the impulse responses functions and the VAR coe¢ cient and covariance matrices. Thus, we can use the output of the Gibbs sampler to analyze the posterior distribution of the parameter estimates directly.
3 3 The Kullback-Leibler Distance is a metric to assess the deviation of one distribution from another. See Kullback and Leibler [1951] for more details regarding how to construct this distance. the percentage of draws from the posterior of alternative impulse responses that lie entirely within the benchmark posterior. Table 2 gives the values of the KLD between the post-war, pre-ZLB benchmark (1960 ( :I-2007 and the full-sample (1960:I-2015:II) when using the FFR and each of the two SSRs. Table 3 shows the percentage of overlap between the posterior distributions of each set of impulse responses.
When including both the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods in the sample, the model with the FFR as the sole policy instrument produces the smallest KLD relative to the benchmark. 34 Additionally, the distribution of impulse responses to the FFR overlap the most with the benchmark for three of the four variables in the VAR, ranging from 54% to 82%. The Krippner SSR produces a larger overlap for the response of GDP (80% versus 77%) but the two measurements are comparable, consistent with our previous results using the full-sample. When looking speci…cally at the ZLB period, the Krippner [2015a] SSR has the smallest KLD and exhibits less variation than the FFR or the Wu and Xia [2016] SSR. Furthermore, the impulse responses to the Krippner SSR overlap the most with the benchmark for three of the four variables in the VAR, ranging from 19% to 43%, substantially more than the other policy measures for these responses. Interestingly, the response of in ‡ation to the Wu-Xia SSR demonstrates the most consistency across subsamples. 35 Examining data from the ZLB period in isolation reveals the bene…t of exploiting variation in the SSRs to produce a comprehensive representation of policy. We cannot compute the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to the FFR at the ZLB as it did not exhibit meaningful variation over this time. Alternatively, shocks to the SSRs maintain some of the pre-ZLB structural dynamics of the macro variables. However, there is little consistency in terms of which policy rate produces the most cohesive measurement of policy when merging together non-ZLB and ZLB subsamples. The SSRs provide the greatest consistency if we employ a dataset encompassing the entire post-war period, including the years at the ZLB. Thus, when we su¢ ciently lifto¤ from zero, the inclusion of a number of years at the ZLB between extended episodes of the more conventional environment does not seem to prohibit the use of standard, linear VARs to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy.
Robustness
In this section, we test whether the results presented in the previous sections are robust to variation in the data, the method of identi…cation, and the timing of the break.
Alternative Data Series
We consider a few common variations in the monetary VAR dataset that one might see in the literature. In particular, we explore alternative de…nitions of in ‡ation, adding the unemployment rate, and adding measures of …nancial conditions. Table 4 outlines the alternative speci…cations that we consider.
First, we consider two alternative measures of the in ‡ation rate. We substitute CPI in ‡ation or PCE in ‡ation for the GDP de ‡ator. The results for the full-sample dataset are similar to those produced under the baseline speci…cation. Additionally, the only slight change in the results is for the response of the in ‡ation rate to policy shocks at the ZLB. In the baseline, the response of GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation to the Wu-Xia SSR most closely resembled the benchmark response to the FFR. Second, we add the unemployment rate to our baseline VAR. The …rst row of Figure 7 displays the response of the unemployment rate to the FFR in the benchmark, the FFR in the full-sample, and to the two SSRs. The magnitude of the response to the FFR and the Wu-Xia SSR over the full sample is slightly larger than the response to the FFR in the benchmark. The response to the Krippner SSR more closely resembles the benchmark, a result supported by the overlap of the distribution of impulse responses being substantially higher with this policy measure. The other responses are qualitatively unchanged and are available from the authors upon request.
Third, we add two di¤erent measures of …nancial conditions separately to the VAR: the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago National Financial Conditions Index and the spread between rates on Baa-rated corporate debt and 10-year Treasury bonds. The second and third rows of Figure 7 show the response of these variables to each policy measure in the benchmark or full-sample period.
When adding the NFCI to the VAR, the FFR produces the largest percentage of overlap in the distribution of impulse responses for all variables using the full-sample dataset. With only data at the ZLB, the Krippner SSR now produces the most consistent responses. Qualitatively, the behavior of our macroeconomic variables is unchanged from the simple, four-variable VAR in the baseline. All three policy measures produce similar responses of the credit spread over the fullsample period. The overlap of the distribution of impulse responses is comparable across policy rates. It is di¢ cult for any policy rate to produce consistent responses of the credit spread and commodity prices with only data at the ZLB.
Alternative Identi…cation
In the previous section, we identi…ed the monetary shock recursively by taking the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix and assuming that the monetary instrument is ordered last.
The literature on identifying monetary shocks using VARs, however, utilizes a variety of di¤erent identi…cation schemes. Some of these schemes are not easily implemented for unconventional policy.
For example, one popular identi…cation scheme uses high frequency fed funds futures data. Because the FFR is at the ZLB, the futures market will not pick up changes in many of the forms of unconventional policy. Instead, we focus on two other methods of identifying monetary shocks: sign restrictions and alternative exclusion restrictions. 36 For ease of exposition, we provide a qualitative discussion of our …ndings here but do not include additional …gures or quantitative results in the tables. These are available from the authors upon request.
We adopt the common assumption that a contractionary monetary policy shock would cause a decline in output, in ‡ation, and commodity prices. Thus, we implement sign restrictions consistent with this assumption: a contractionary monetary policy shock increases the policy rate and decreases GDP growth, in ‡ation, and PCOM for at least three quarters. To impose these sign restrictions, we follow the methodology of Fry and Pagan [2011] . 37 The responses of GDP growth and in ‡ation to a contractionary monetary policy shock are comparable across the alternative policy measures. The impulse responses for the pre-ZLB period 3 6 Fry and Pagan [2005] was the …rst to explore using sign restrictions to identify monetary shocks. Fry and Pagan [2011] have a fairly recent survey. Leeper and Zha [2003] used exclusion restrictions to identify monetary shocks.
3 7 The Fry and Pagan [2011] method …rst requires estimation of the reduced-form VAR to obtain the variancecovariance matrix. Then, we construct a Givens matrix to rotate chol ( ) 0 and test whether the impulse responses suggested by this new contemporaneous-impact matrix satisfy the sign restrictions. We retain only those draws which satisfy our conditions. See Fry and Pagan [2011] for a more thorough discussion. and the full sample, including the ZLB period, generally overlap. The only exception is for the response of PCOM. Thus, there may be alternative sign restrictions one could impose for this variable. When examining the ZLB period in isolation, the responses of GDP and in ‡ation to shocks to the Krippner shadow rate more consistently fall within the posterior coverage from the pre-ZLB subsample.
Secondly, the alternative exclusion restrictions we consider follow the approach of Leeper and Zha [2003] . We separate the variables into three blocks: the macroeconomic block (real GDP, prices, and the unemployment rate); the monetary block (the M2 money stock and the policy instrument); ; where all other elements are restricted to be zero.
Like the previous results using sign restrictions, the responses of most variables to a contractionary monetary policy shock are qualitatively comparable across policy measures. The full-sample impulse responses tend to overlap with the pre-ZLB responses. Alternatively, when examining the ZLB period in isolation, the impulse responses of M2, the policy rate, and in ‡ation to SSR shocks are contained within the posterior coverage of the responses from the pre-ZLB period more often than are responses to FFR shocks. The unemployment rate responds similarly to the FFR and the Wu-Xia SSR but the responses of GDP and commodity prices rarely fall within the pre-ZLB posterior coverage for any policy measure. In summary, we obtain similar conclusions from identi…cation via exclusion or sign restrictions to those from the simple Cholesky decomposition in our original speci…cation.
Varying the Break Dates
We imposed the break in the model when the nominal FFR reached the ZLB. One could make credible arguments that the macroeconomic dynamics-and the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, in particular-changed either before or after the date at which the policy rate crossed the ZLB.
Here, we explore whether the results are robust to altering the break date. We consider potential break dates at each quarter from 2007:IV through 2008:IV by constructing Bayes Factors using the method described in Section 2.3.
For every quarter within this range, we …nd signi…cant evidence with the FFR of a break in the coe¢ cients in the equations for the macro variables in the VAR and a break in the covariance matrix (A RX (L) and ). This is consistent with our original results and provides further evidence that linearity of the VAR is violated when using the FFR across pre-ZLB and ZLB periods. We initially found only weak evidence of a break in A RX (L) in 2007:IV when using the Wu-Xia SSR. This is the only date for which we …nd any evidence of a break. Furthermore, we …nd zero evidence suggesting a break is necessary at any of these dates with the Krippner SSR. Both SSRs are much more successful than the FFR at preserving linearity in the model.
Conclusions
Researchers attempting to measure the e¤ects of monetary policy during the …nancial crisis and subsequent recession beginning in 2008 have encountered di¢ culties when trying to use the FFR which essentially ‡atlines at zero for much of the period under consideration. We have proposed using the shadow rate as a measure of policy which is able to ‡uctuate to negative values when the e¤ective central bank policy rate faces a binding constraint at zero. Our results suggest that the shadow rates act as a good proxy for monetary policy throughout the ZLB environment only if using a dataset that spans both the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods. Furthermore, when considering the ZLB period in isolation, the Krippner [2015a] shadow rate may be successful in characterizing the stance of monetary policy.
Examining the FFR alone may suggest that policy has become inactive or ine¤ective but the monetary authority has indeed been successful at implementing expansionary policy albeit through alternative mechanisms. An important point to note is that the economy has witnessed a break in the instrument used to enact policy but not a break in the e¤ects of monetary policy on the (2015) shadow rate as the policy instrument. The thick green line and the green shaded area give the median IRF point estimates and 90% posterior coverage, respectively, using only data from the ZLB period. The thick blue line and the blue shaded region replicate the plots from the benchmark model. Third panel: IRF of VAR(1) using data from the ZLB period only and using the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate as the policy instrument. give the median IRF point estimates and 90% posterior coverage, respectively, incorporating data through the ZLB period without accounting for any potential changing macroeconomic dynamics. The thick blue line and the blue shaded region replicate the plots from the benchmark model. Third panel: IRF of full-sample VAR using the Krippner (2015) shadow rate as the policy instrument through the ZLB period. Fourth panel: IRF of full-sample VAR using the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate as the policy instrument through the ZLB period.
